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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, I published a paper titled Remedial Discretion in
Constitutional Adjudication. 1 The paper responded to scholarly calls for
the revival of a strand of the Warren Court’s non-retroactivity
jurisprudence. 2 That strand, known as “selective prospectivity,” held that
path-breaking rulings establishing new constitutional rights must apply to
the parties in the cases in which they are announced but need not apply to
parties in other cases pending on direct review. 3 Scholars favoring a
revival of selective prospectivity argued that it would enable more
constitutional innovation by providing the Supreme Court with an
important tool for managing the costs of legal change. 4 My paper argued,
in response, that the Court’s untheorized but de facto practice of
developing doctrines that sometimes withhold relief in cases where the
Constitution permits constitutional violations to go without a remedy—
e.g., the qualified-immunity doctrine, exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Research and Development, University of New
Hampshire School of Law. I am grateful to Tracy Thomas for inviting me to participate in this
symposium on constitutional remedies, and to the other symposium participants for helpful feedback
and a thoroughly enjoyable day. I also appreciate the excellent editorial assistance provided by Sarah
Smith and the editors of ConLawNOW.
1. John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
881 (2014).
2. The Supreme Court rejected non-retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 32028 (1987) (rejecting non-retroactivity for criminal cases on direct review), and Harper v. Va. Dep’t
of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993) (rejecting non-retroactivity for non-habeas civil cases).
3. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1967).
4. See Toby J. Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 59697 (2012); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922,
972 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, & Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 173, 1733-38 (1991).
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harmless-error rules—was both sufficient to manage the costs of
constitutional change and preferable to reviving selective prospectivity,
which is inconsistent with important rule-of-law values. 5
Of necessity, the paper also developed and defended a theory of
when and how courts may withhold remedies for constitutional
violations. 6 It sought to demonstrate that the Court has properly confined
its practice of developing doctrines that withhold relief for constitutional
wrongs to claims for the sub-constitutional remedies—i.e., money
damages, the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and the
vacatur of tainted judgments—that function as substitutes for
constitutional interests irretrievably lost as a result of wholly-concluded
rights-violations. 7 In contrast, when faced with justiciable, properly raised
and preserved, and meritorious claims for specific relief from ongoing
constitutional violations, the Court has properly regarded relief as
obligatory. 8
In this paper, I elaborate on two important questions raised by my
argument that deserve a bit more attention. First, is there a correct way to
define constitutional violations as “ongoing” or “wholly-concluded”?
Second, can I reconcile the argument that a remedy for an ongoing
constitutional violation is mandatory with cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education II 9 and Brown v. Plata, 10 where the Supreme Court did not
provide the plaintiffs with immediate relief from systematic constitutional
violations? These two questions will be the topics of Parts III and IV of
this essay. Part II contextualizes the discussion in Parts III and IV by
concisely summarizing my argument as to when courts may withhold
remedies for constitutional violations, and when they may not.
II.WHEN MAY COURTS WITHHOLD REMEDIES FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS?
Judges and lawyers typically use the historical terms “legal” and
“equitable” when classifying remedies. But the use of these terms in the
5. See Greabe, supra note 1, at 919-32.
6. The theory had been hypothesized in earlier work. See John M. Greabe, Constitutional
Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857 (2013).
7. See Greabe, supra note 1, at 912-17.
8. See id. at 917-19.
9. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Brown II”). Brown II addressed the
issue of remedy left unanswered in the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Brown I”), which held unconstitutional racial discrimination in
assigning students to public schools.
10. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (addressing unconstitutional prison overcrowding).
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context of remedies for constitutional violations obscures some basic
truths. Consider that when law students learn the conventional account of
our remedial tradition, they learn that courts may exercise equitable
powers to withhold remedies that would undermine the public interest.
Yet equity is typically associated with specific remedies. And, as we shall
see, in the context of constitutional litigation, the withholding of remedies
as a consequence of public-interest balancing occurs primarily within the
context of claims for substitutionary remedies, not claims for specific
relief. Thus, it is far more useful to classify remedies for constitutional
violations in terms of how they function—viz., either as vehicles for
“specific” relief or as “substitutes” for constitutional interests lost as a
result of constitutional wrongs. For unlike the law/equity divide, the line
between specific and substitutionary remedies marks a boundary of
constitutional significance in constitutional litigation. 11
In using the term “specific” to describe one class of remedies for
constitutional violations, I refer to those remedies that enable a rightholder either to halt an ongoing-deprivation, or to avoid an imminent
deprivation, of a constitutionally protected interest.12 Specific remedies
thus provide or restore to the right-holder an interest that the Constitution
protects. 13 Specific remedies for constitutional violations include court
rulings that nullify unconstitutional statutes or rules by which the
government brings criminal charges or other coercive enforcement
proceedings; rulings enjoining coercive enforcement proceedings where
the statute or rule authorizing the proceeding cannot constitutionally be
applied on the facts of the case; injunctions and declarations that enjoin
or prohibit ongoing or imminent rights-violations occasioned by
government actions other than coercive enforcement proceedings; the
provision of access to a judicial office by means of the Great Writ of
habeas corpus (so long as Congress has not lawfully suspended it); the
provision of just compensation for a government taking; and make-whole
relief for the imposition of unconstitutional taxes, duties, or fees. 14
In using the term “substitutionary” to describe the other class of
remedies for constitutional violations, I refer to those remedies that
provide “something else” after a constitutional violation has caused a
right-holder to suffer an irretrievable loss of a constitutionally protected

11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 903-05.
See id. at 905.
See id.
See id. at 909-10.
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interest. 15 The quintessential substitutionary remedy is a monetary
damage award of the sort authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the cause
of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics. 16 But in the context of constitutional litigation, two
other substitutionary remedies are commonplace. The first is the exclusion
of evidence at trial obtained by means of a prior violation of procedural
rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The second is the vacatur of a court judgment when constitutional error
occurred during, or in relation to, the judicial proceedings that led to the
judgment. 17
There is a fundamental difference in the nature of constitutional
violations that ground claims for specific relief and those that ground
claims for substitutionary remedies. 18 Specific remedies are possible only
when the underlying constitutional violation is, in a meaningful sense,
ongoing when challenged in court. 19 And such ongoing violations are
almost inevitably grounded in unconstitutional government policies or
customs such as statutes, rules, regulations, practices, broadly applicable
understandings, and the decisions of those who function as government
policymakers. 20 Substitutionary remedies, in contrast, usually involve the
wholly completed, discretionary actions of persons entrusted with
government power who must exercise that power in dynamic and varying
circumstances according to general norms provided by the Constitution
and constitutional precedent. 21
In the context of challenges to ongoing violations rooted in
unconstitutional policies or customs, the Supreme Court has regarded a
remedy as obligatory—at least so long as the claim targeting the violation
is justiciable, properly preserved, and brought at a proper time and in a
proper forum. 22 But in the context of challenges to wholly completed
violations that give rise to claims for substitutionary relief, the Court has
developed remedy-limiting doctrines such as qualified immunity,
15. See id. at 905-06.
16. 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971).
17. See Greabe, supra note 1, at 908-09.
18. See id. at 910-12.
19. See id. at 911-12.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 910-11. The qualifier “usually” is necessary because wholly-completed rights
invasions can be rooted in an unconstitutional government policy and custom that remains in effect
when a remedy is sought. In such circumstances, the victimized right-holder may obtain both a
specific remedy directed at the policy and custom and a substitutionary remedy for the harm actually
suffered. See id. at 911 n.155.
22. See id. at 917-19.
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exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and harmless-error principles. 23 Such
doctrines permit courts to take account of the public interest and withhold
remedies in circumstances where (according to the Court) the equitable
balance so dictates. 24
Although the Supreme Court has never explained its actions in these
terms, it has appropriately regarded specific relief addressed to ongoing
constitutional violations rooted in government policy or custom as
obligatory while simultaneously regarding substitutionary relief
addressed to wholly completed wrongs as contingent and subject to being
withheld when a provision of a remedy would undermine the public
interest. 25 Specific relief is more clearly rooted in the text and structure of
the Constitution than substitutionary relief. 26 The Constitution explicitly
requires access to a judicial officer through the Great Writ of habeas
corpus and the provision of just compensation for a taking. 27 Moreover,
specific relief more directly operationalizes claims brought to enforce
structural values such as federal supremacy, federalism, the separation of
powers, and non-interference by government with individual rights. 28
After all, as just noted, specific relief acts to stop ongoing unconstitutional
conduct at the lawmaking level, where the effects of the constitutional
transgression are broadly applicable and capable of victimizing others.
Thus, it serves as the means by which courts perform the quintessential
function of judicial review, which is to impose the constitutional rule of
law on the political branches of government. 29
Substitutionary remedies, by contrast, lack the same direct link to the
text or structure of the Constitution. 30 They inherently provide less
narrowly tailored relief than specific remedies deliver, for they fail to
prevent, halt, or undo the constitutional violations to which they
respond. 31 Moreover, substitutionary remedies such as money damage
awards, suppression orders that can lead to the release of dangerous
criminals, and a repeated trial can generate significant social costs that
third parties not involved in the right-violating event must bear. 32 To be
sure, they are crucial for ensuring adherence to constitutional norms.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. at 912-17.
See id.
See id. at 919-23.
See id. at 921.
See id. at 921-22.
See id. at 921.
See id. at 922.
See id. at 920.
See id.
See id. at 920-21.
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Eliminating them without replacing them with effective alternatives
would invite an intolerable level of constitutional under-enforcement. 33
But while substitutionary remedies are essential to our constitutional order
as a class, the Supreme Court has reasonably regarded them as
individually contingent and susceptible to legislative or judicial
expansion, contraction, or replacement in light of the perceived public
interest. 34
III. IS THERE A CORRECT WAY TO DEFINE CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS AS “ONGOING” OR “WHOLLY- CONCLUDED”?
As should be clear, the argument outlined in Part II is not a builtfrom-scratch, normative account of when courts should withhold
remedies for constitutional violations. Rather, it is a largely descriptive
account that seeks to elaborate on the groundbreaking work of Professors
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer by rationalizing what the
Supreme Court has done and suggesting that its approach is more
principled than may appear. 35 But in moving beyond unhelpful
classifications like “legal” and “equitable” and stressing the need to focus
on remedial function, the argument needs some additional definitional
work. For the difference between an “ongoing” and “wholly-concluded”
constitutional violation is not always evident.
This point was driven home to me when I wrote my most recent
article, which argued for comprehensive reform of harmless-error
doctrines. 36 My harmless-error argument required, at the threshold,
acceptance of the premise that there is no constitutional barrier to the
doctrinal reforms I would be proposing. This, in turn, required acceptance
that the harmless-error test applied to constitutional trial errors—the rule
of Chapman v. California 37—is not constitutionally mandated. Put more
simply, my argument required acceptance that, as a matter of
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, &
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 173, 1787-91 (1991). In their influential 1991 article,
Professors Fallon and Meltzer argued that (1) there should be a strong but not always unyielding
presumption in favor of individually effective relief for every constitutional violation; and (2) there
must exist a sufficient scheme of available remedies to ensure that constitutional rights do not become
nullities and that government officials remain answerable as a systemic matter to the demands of the
law. The argument sketched in Part II sought to put some meat on the bones of this persuasive but
somewhat abstract two-part proposition.
36. See John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 59 (2016).
37. 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967) (holding that at least some constitutional trial errors may be
found to be harmless if the government can establish their harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt).

2018]

REMEDIAL DISCRETION IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

43

constitutional law, appellate courts can withhold remedies for
constitutional trial errors under some standard other than Chapman’s
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt formulation.
Under the theory outlined in Part II, there is no constitutional barrier
to arguing for a change in applicable harmless-error rules—at least so long
as one accepts my characterization of new trial orders responsive to
constitutional trial errors as substitutionary remedies responsive to
wholly-concluded constitutional violations. That characterization seemed
clearly correct to me. After all, at least superficially, an appellate ruling
vacating a lower court judgment and ordering a new trial provides
“something else”—i.e., a substitute form of relief—to one victimized by
a constitutional error during an earlier trial.
But this characterization is not self-evident. In an excellent paper
published shortly after I advanced the theory outlined in Part II, Professor
Richard M. Re posited that the entry of a criminal judgment tainted by a
constitutional trial error that cannot be said to have been harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt constitutes a violation of due process separate and
apart from the constitutional error that tainted the conviction. 38 What’s
more, Professor Re argued, it works a deprivation of due process that is
ongoing and therefore requires the provision of an appellate remedy as a
matter of constitutional law. 39
In my harmless-error paper, I responded to Professor Re’s argument
and defended my characterization of constitutional trial error as whollyconcluded once it occurs and of a new trial order responsive to a
constitutional trial error as a substitutionary remedy that is not required as
a matter of constitutional law. 40 I argued that, while normatively
attractive, Re’s theory is difficult to reconcile with the doctrines and
practices that inform the law of constitutional remedies. First, the right
that Re posits could only be vindicated on appeal. And yet, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that there is no constitutional right to appeal
from a criminal judgment. 41 Moreover, it is difficult to see how the right
might be located within some doctrine that places constitutional limits on
the government’s decision to provide constitutionally gratuitous
procedures. 42
38. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1912
(2014).
39. See id. at 1915-17.
40. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 93-95.
41. See, e.g., Martinez v. Ct. of App. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102, 110 (1996); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 119 (1995) (per curiam).
42. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 94.
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Second, the appellate judgment-call that vindication of the right
would entail only rarely curbs a more broadly applicable policy or custom
that, if left unaddressed, might also deprive others of their rights.43 Rather,
such a judgment-call usually requires an appeals court only to decide on
a unique set of facts whether, at a discrete point in time, the trial judge
failed to enforce a constitutional norm and, if so, whether the error was
harmless. The underlying ruling—the unconstitutional actus reus—is
typically a discretionary, fact-dependent judgment-call that government
actors must make all the time. Within our system, remedies for “mistakes”
(in the view of the appeals court) made in the course of such judgmentcalls are not regarded as mandatory. Rather, remedy-withholding
principles allow for some room to breathe and decline to impose costly
remedies without some additional showing that the remedy is worth the
cost.
Third, principles governing the provision of remedies on collateral
review are inconsistent with viewing the victim of a constitutional trial
error as enduring a separate, ongoing constitutional violation when the
government cannot satisfy the Chapman test. 44 A habeas court that
disagrees with a state appeals court’s determination that a constitutional
trial error was harmless under Chapman does not simply grant the writ.
Rather, federal law requires the court to accord an extra measure of
deference and withhold a remedy unless the state appeals court’s ruling
was patently unreasonable. 45 Contrast this remedy-withholding rule with
how habeas courts deal with cases involving undoubtedly ongoing
violations—those where the statute under which the petitioner was
convicted is determined by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. In
such cases, habeas courts are under an obligation to provide relief.46
All of that said, while I continue to believe that it is more natural and
consistent with applicable doctrines to characterize constitutional trial
errors as wholly-concluded once made and new-trial orders as
substitutionary, I acknowledge that the question is not one that can be
answered ontologically. Natural reality would not preclude the Supreme
43. See id.
44. See id. at 95.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996) (prohibiting a grant of habeas relief unless the state
court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540
U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that § 2254(d)(1) applies to state-court determinations
that a constitutional violation is harmless under Chapman).
46. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307-10 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,) (plurality opinion)
(requiring a habeas court to provide a remedy when the Supreme Court issues a new rule that makes
previously punishable conduct constitutionally protected).
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Court from recognizing an individual due-process right to be free from
criminal convictions tainted by constitutional trial errors that cannot be
said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor would it
preclude the Court from characterizing such a constitutional violation as
ongoing, even though such a characterization would give rise to a number
of inconstancies and tensions with the doctrines presently governing
remedies for constitutional violations.
But the key point is this: a descriptive theory of the sort I advanced
does not require ontologically unassailable premises in order to be
persuasive. Rather, it requires only that its premises be reasonable. So,
the first part of the codicil that I would like to add to the argument set
forth in Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication is simply this:
it is reasonable to understand qualified immunity, exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, and harmless-error rules as doctrines that withhold
substitutionary remedies for wholly-concluded constitutional wrongs—
wrongs typically committed by actors vested with government power who
must enforce the law according to constitutional norms, as they
understand them, in varying and dynamic circumstances. Moreover, if one
accepts that these characterizations are reasonable, then it also is
reasonable to say that, under our system of constitutional remedies, the
Supreme Court has confined its practice of developing doctrines that
withhold any relief for constitutional wrongs to claims for remedies that
function as substitutes for constitutional interests irretrievably lost as a
result of wholly-concluded rights-violations. In contrast, when faced with
justiciable, properly raised and preserved, and meritorious claims for
specific relief from ongoing constitutional violations, the Court has
regarded a remedy as obligatory.
IV.WHAT RELIEF MUST COURTS PROVIDE FOR ONGOING
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS?
But if, as I claim, the Supreme Court has regarded a remedy for
ongoing constitutional violations as obligatory—at least when such
violations are established by means of justiciable claims properly raised
and preserved in a proper forum—how should one understand rulings
such as Brown v. Board of Education II 47 and Brown v. Plata? 48 In Brown
II, of course, the Court did not require the immediate desegregation of
facially segregated public schools; it required only that such

47.
48.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
563 U.S. 493 (2011).

46

CONLAWNOW

[9:37

desegregation proceed “with all deliberate speed.” 49 And in Plata, the
Court upheld an injunction requiring only that the State release convicts
from unconstitutionally overcrowded prisons within two years. 50 Should
we not understand these cases to support the proposition that courts
sometimes may withhold remedies even for ongoing violations?
My answer to this question—the second part of this codicil—posits
a constitutionally significant difference between the act of declaring
unconstitutional a government policy or custom that is causing the
claimant ongoing harm, and the provision of additional relief designed to
ameliorate the present and future effects of the invasion of rights on the
claimant. 51 My argument is that only the former is constitutionally
required; courts retain remedial discretion to engage in public-interest
balancing with respect to the latter. And this sometimes leads courts to
impose time, place, and manner limits on requests for the provision of
tangible relief that goes beyond law declaration.
In this respect, consider how the rulings in Brown II and Plata differ
from cases where courts deny substitutionary remedies under doctrines
such as qualified immunity, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and
harmless-error principles. In cases involving the denial of substitutionary
remedies, courts often do not even reach the question whether a
constitutional violation occurred. Rather, the unavailability of a remedy is
deemed to be sufficient grounds for rejecting the claim. 52 Moreover, even
if the court does decide whether a constitutional violation occurred, it
typically decides nothing more than that a government agent violated a
constitutional norm in the course of enforcing the law in unique and
idiosyncratic circumstances. While such statements have precedential
value in future cases that must decide, for example, whether government
agents have violated “clearly established” rights, 53 they do not have the
effect of declaring unconstitutional a government policy or custom that, if
left undisturbed, could be applied to invade the rights of others.
In Brown II and Plata, in contrast, the Supreme Court at least
implicitly declared unconstitutional and rendered prospectively
unlawful—and therefore at least subject to enforcement by means of the
contempt power—governmental customs and policies that either were
49. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
50. Plata, 563 U.S. at 500-01, 509-10.
51. See Greabe, supra note 1, at 905 n.133.
52. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,) (plurality opinion) (praising the
practice of bypassing constitutional rulings in situations where no remedy is available).
53. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining the requirements of the
qualified-immunity doctrine).
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affecting, or had the potential to affect, numerous parties not before the
Court. From the point of view of the claimants who brought suit, an
implicit declaration of this sort might be little consolation for the lingering
effects of the unconstitutional custom or policy that continue after the
judgment is entered. But it is not entirely without value. For at a minimum,
by stating the prospective rights and duties of the parties, it therefore can
serve as the basis of future, additional relief from the court. 54
But beyond this, law declarations of this sort operationalize the
promise that persons seeking remedies for constitutional violations act not
only for themselves, but also for the benefits of the rest of us. They act, in
other words, as private attorneys general enforcing constitutional norms.
And, even for those who embrace a modest, “private rights” view of the
role of courts within our constitutional system, declarations that
government policies and customs violate the Constitution undeniably
have played, and continue to play, a critical role in keeping the coordinate
branches of the federal government, and the states, within constitutional
bounds. Courts have discretion in determining the timing and scope of
injunctive relief. But they cannot abstain from making the required
choice-of-law determination when a party asserts a justiciable and
otherwise properly presented claim that a government policy or custom
conflicts with the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must have the power to engage in public-interest balancing,
and sometimes to withhold remedies, when claimants request remedies
for constitutional violations other than declarations that a properly
challenged government policy or custom is unconstitutional (or is being
unconstitutionally applied). This power is necessary for courts to manage
the costs of constitutional innovation and otherwise to balance the rights
of constitutional claimants against the interests of the public, who must
bear the often significant costs generated by such remedies. But this power
to withhold remedies other than declaratory relief is also sufficient for
performing these necessary tasks. Courts should therefore decline to
embrace selective prospectivity or other doctrines that countenance even
more withholding of remedies for constitutional violations. Such
doctrines are unnecessary and undermine important rule-of-law values
that the present approach leaves undisturbed.

54.

See Greabe, supra note 1, at 905 n.133.

